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 Abstract – We propose a modeling approach based on 
belief networks to capture and understand the systemic 
nature of risks affecting supply networks. By aligning the 
purpose of a model with the nature of supply management 
decisions, we provide a mechanism for identifying 
relevant supply risks so that we can visualize inter-
dependencies between risks and predict their effects on 
supply performance. By using a belief network modeling 
formalism we can use diagnostics to understand the key 
drivers of unwanted risk scenarios and to explore the 
efficacy of possible risk mitigating actions. We illustrate 
how belief network modeling can be used to manage the 
risk/reward position and provide new insights into supply 
risks through an example for the medicine supply chain of 
a regional health service provider. 
 
Keywords – Belief network, medicine supply, supply 
chain, risk management  
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Risk management in supply networks (SN) has been a 
growing area of research in operations, supply chain and 
management science [1]. A major challenge facing supply 
chain management is that many recent strategies and 
approaches to SN design, which aim to increase supply 
chain efficiency, actually tend to make the SN more 
vulnerable and exposed to risks. For example: lean and 
just-in-time strategies seek to eliminate resource wastage 
but may end up reducing buffers against supply risk; 
outsourcing and increased reliance on global transport and 
logistics are meant to cut production costs but may 
introduce new sources of SN risk. Consequently we need 
to better understand and proactively manage SN risk.   
To date, SN risk research has focused upon 
understanding and classifying the source. Such 
classification taxonomies implicitly assume that risks can 
be categorized into mutually exclusive classes. However, 
it is acknowledged that risks in increasingly complex SN 
are interconnected [2], [3]. Therefore classifications can 
be useful in typifying sources of risk but are not sufficient 
for effective management. In this article, we argue that 
modeling provides a means of capturing and analyzing the 
inter-dependencies between risks to support useful 
decisions about SN management.  
As an example, consider our motivating problem 
which relates to a medicine supply in NHS Greater 
Glasgow and Clyde (NHS GG&C). This is the largest 
NHS organization in Scotland, serving a population of 1.2 
million people. In 2010 there was a major change to the 
medicine supply chain. In the new medicine SN, 
numerous local stockholdings have been replaced by a 
large, robot-controlled Distribution Centre (DC), which 
stocks medicines from multiple external suppliers and 
distributes medicines to all hospital wards and pharmacies 
within the NHS GG&C area. The intended benefits 
included: (a) increased efficiency based on the risk-
pooling effect of centralized inventory holding in the 
presence of stochastic demands for medicines; and (b) 
improved customer service through the high order-picking 
speeds and accuracy of the distribution robots.  
As with any project designed to implement a new 
process, risk management was critical: “The overall goal 
of risk management is to have an environment of No 
Surprises where we understand the risks we face and 
eliminate or control them to an acceptable level, by 
creating a culture founded upon assessment and 
prevention of risk. [4, p. 5]. NHS GG&C used risk 
registers, a standard risk management approach. A review 
of the implementation of the new medicine SN 
acknowledged that many of the anticipated risk drivers 
were in fact more complex than initially believed because 
of the inter-dependencies between risks that had the 
potential to impact supply. For example, risks such as 
changes in staff morale or a new IT system were 
anticipated but appeared as independent events in the risk 
register. In reality these risks were systemic because of 
adverse interactions between IT and robotics problems 
with attitudes of, and actions by, staff relating to the new 
technology. 
 In this article we discuss how modeling can support 
identification of SN risk events and their inter-
relationships. We adopt Belief Networks (BN) [5] as our 
modeling formalism for the following reasons: a BN can 
represent uncertain relationships between risk events; the 
uncertainty regarding the occurrence of a risk event can 
be quantified as a probability; and analysis grounded in 
the theory of Bayesian methods can be conducted. BN 
have been used in other risk management applications, but 
apart from [6], [7] there has been little consideration of 
their use in a SN context.  
Section II provides an overview of our general BN 
modeling approach for SN risk. In Section III we present 
a selection of analysis of the SN risk modeling of the 
NHS GG&C medicine supply to hospital inpatients. We 
summarize our conclusions and reflections in Section IV. 
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II. BN MODELING PROCESS FOR SN RISK 
 
A. Belief Network Modeling Concept 
Fig. 1 shows the key concepts underpinning our 
approach to BN modeling for SN risk. The diagram 
represents the cause-effect relations between SN risk 
events. The “effect” corresponds to the SN performance 
measure of interest. The “causes” may include both root 
causes as well as intermediate events. Risk mitigation 
strategies may be selected to impact “causes” or “effects”. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Belief network (BN) SN risk modeling concept 
 
The ultimate “effect” may correspond to overall SN 
performance. For example, costs, quality, or customer 
service level performance depending on type of SN and 
the organizational goals. The “causes” of SN risk events 
are extensive but we assume these can be due to 
disruptions caused by the external environment, demand-
side uncertainty, supply-side uncertainty and 
vulnerabilities internal to the organization [8]. Uncertainty 
in the occurrence of the “effect” events are expressed as a 
probability conditional on their “causal” events.  
A risk mitigation strategy will encompass a set of 
actions designed to remove or reduce the effect of an 
event. For example, by removing the root cause, or 
providing a barrier to reduce an intermediate event threat, 
or providing an alternative supply route through back-up 
provision. Note, however, that the usual risk mitigation 
tactics of redundancy and diversity may fundamentally 
alter the risk/reward position of the organization. 
 
B. Key Stages of Belief Network Modeling    
Our model building process, summarized in Table I, 
is informed by general approaches for BN modeling [9] 
and is grounded in our experience of risk analysis [10].  
We assume a meta-stakeholder exists within the client 
organization with ownership of the SN and a commitment 
to support risk analysis. Such a person plays important 
gatekeeping and championing roles thus ensuring 
modeling is aligned with supply risk management. 
Building real BN is both an art and a science since the 
goal is to construct a model that appropriately represents 
stakeholder knowledge. While the main stages in our 
scientific model building, as explained in the remainder of 
this Section, may appear very structured, it is important to 
note that in practice these stages are not necessarily linear 
and iteration between activities is common. 
 
 
Stage 1:  Identify SN scope and stakeholders – 
Together with the meta-stakeholder we explore the main 
aspects of SN performance to be understood from a risk 
perspective.  In this way we scope our “top event” or set 
of “top events”. Using these events as a focal point we 
bound the SN so that we can determine relevant 
stakeholders, individuals or organizational units, who 
might contribute to modeling.   
Stage 2: Visual representation of SN process flow – 
Understanding the details of the supply flows through 
process mapping or some other means of visualizing the 
SN as a system in an appropriate diagram, is important to 
support systematic investigation of potential risk events. 
Stage 3: Gain qualitative understanding of SN risk 
events – By interviewing relevant individual stakeholders 
with operational experience and using the process flow as 
a guide, we develop causal maps to capture their cause-
effect reasoning about SN risk events. The modeler, 
together with meta-stakeholder, will integrate the 
individual causal maps to generate an initial qualitative 
model of the SN. Workshops, or other equivalent means, 
can be used to bring stakeholders together to challenge the 
overall map and refine it through facilitated discussion.
 Stage 4: Structure the provisional BN SN risk model – 
The modeler should review the causal map representing 
stakeholder understanding and ensure that it conforms to 
the formalism of BN. That is, structuring the BN so that 
the property of conditional independence is satisfied and 
that there are no cyclical relationships. Each risk event 
should be represented as a variable within the BN and the 
states of each variable, assuming they can be defined as 
discrete states (e.g. bad snow, light snow, no snow) or 
they can be discretized (e.g. material flow). For more 
information on the BN modeling formalism, see [5] and 
for guidance on translating causal maps to a BN see [11]. 
Stage 5: Refine the BN SN risk structure – A 
facilitated workshop with stakeholders and Meta-
  TABLE I 
 PROCESS TO DEVELOP BELIEF NETWORK SN RISK MODEL 
Stage Activity Method  Participants 
1 Identify SN scope 
and stakeholders 
Interview Meta-stakeholder 
2 Visual 
representation of 
SN process flow 
Documentation 
Interview 
Stakeholders 
3 Gain qualitative 
understanding of 
SN risk events 
Interview  Stakeholders,   
Meta-stakeholder 
4 Structure the 
provisional BN SN 
risk model 
Align with BN 
formalism 
Modeler 
5 Refine the BN SN 
risk structure 
Workshop Stakeholders, 
Meta-stakeholder 
6 Quantify the BN 
SN risk model 
Interview Stakeholders 
7 Use BN to support 
SN risk analysis 
Analysis with 
software tool 
Modeler 
8 Validate BN SN 
risk model behavior 
Workshop Stakeholder, 
Meta-stakeholder 
 
Root cause 
Intermediate event 
SN performance 
Cause 
Mitigation 
strategy  Effect 
 
  
stakeholder allows review of the BN structure and the 
definition of model variables. The aim is to challenge the 
BN and refine it so that there is agreement on the 
representation of the risk events to be included in the 
model as well as ensuring the anticipated dependencies 
between risks have been captured appropriately. 
  Stage 6: Quantify the BN SN risk model – Prior to 
interviewing individual stakeholders, a questionnaire can 
be developed to frame questions used to obtain subjective 
probability assessments of the chance of occurrence of 
risk events. During the interview such questions might be 
asked about the likely frequency of events. For example, 
Think about urgent orders to the DC (during May 2012 
to April 2013). In 100 medicines which could be ordered 
urgently for the DC, how many of them could be 
requested but might not be in the DC stock catalogue?.    
 Stage 7: Use BN to support SN risk analysis – Several 
software tools exist to support BN analysis. We have used 
GeNIe [12]. Typically, each tool has common basic 
functions for analysis of, for example, the chance of the 
top event (i.e. performance of SN given the risk events to 
which it is exposed). Or, to control particular states of that 
top event, or indeed any other event, to identify which are 
the main causes that would most likely lead to that state of 
the event occurring. The former analysis allows SN 
performance to be predicted under risk and uncertainty for 
particular situations, while the latter analysis allows 
causes of unwelcome events to be prioritized for action. 
Stage 8: Validate BN SN risk model behavior – Face 
validity can be achieved by gaining feedback from 
stakeholders on model structure and resulting outcomes. 
We can establish the degree of sensitivity of the BN to 
changes in variables or the probabilities associated with 
their states. Scenario analysis can be used to explore 
meaningful cases defined by stakeholders to investigate 
the behavior of the SN under possible risk futures. 
  
III. ANALYSIS OF MEDICINE SUPPLY RISK 
 
 We present example analysis of the medicine supply 
risk in NHS GG&C. Our analysis was conducted after the 
initial project to introduce the new medicine supply was 
embedded within operations and was being reviewed. We 
focus here on the risks associated with the ongoing day-
to-day process of medicine supply within the new SN, 
and not on the risks that had been associated with the 
prior project to implement the new SN design. We 
explain the key characteristics of the medicine supply 
chain, discuss how the modeling process as in Table I was 
implemented, then present selected analysis. 
 
A. NHS GG&C Medicine SN 
Fig. 2 provides a simplified schematic of the hospital 
medicine SN showing the agents on the supply and 
demand side of the DC, our focal point. The 14 hospitals 
in the NHS GG&C area represent the agents on the 
demand side of the DC. Each hospital has a single 
dispensary/pharmacy as well as multiple ward cupboards 
(the quantity of which depends on the size of hospital). 
An innovation has been to connect inpatients directly to 
the SN by asking inpatients to bring their personal 
medicines when admitted to hospital. This is termed 
Patients Own Drugs (POD). Appropriate quality checks 
are made before storage of a patient’s own medicines in 
his/her bedside POD locker. The medicines in each 
patient’s locker can then be topped up from either the 
cupboard on the patient’s ward or the hospital dispensary. 
When patients are discharged, they will normally take the 
remaining medicines in their locker home with them.   
The main medicines required for any specific 
treatment will be prepared and stocked in the ward to 
which the patient is admitted. If an inpatient needs 
medicines that are not available from the ward stock (e.g. 
either not being listed in the ward’s stock catalogue or out 
of stock at the time) then staff can use the Individual 
Patient Supply (IPS) system to order the medicine as an 
urgent request, providing a back-up process. The hospital 
dispensary will be responsible for filling this request. If 
the medicine is not available in the hospital dispensary, 
dispensary staff can follow a standard process in order to 
source the medicine from other wards in the hospital, 
other local hospitals, DC, other suppliers, or other 
hospitals, in that order of priority. All medicines for a 
particular inpatient will be stored in a personal POD 
locker that is located the patient’s bedside.  
On the supply side, all general medicines can be 
ordered by and delivered to the DC, primarily from 
wholesalers and manufacturers.  
NHS GG&C aims to have an agile medicine SN, 
which is achieved by having sufficiently high flexibility 
to absorb varying inpatient requirements. The DC is 
meant to provide regular top-ups for hospital dispensaries 
and ward cupboards, while the IPS system functions as a 
backup system to respond to urgent needs from individual 
inpatients. However, while flexibility and agility are 
highly important, cost considerations cannot be neglected 
by any means because of the very high medicines 
expenditure by the organization (about £120 million per 
year). In other words, NHS GG&C must closely monitor 
its risk/reward position. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Simplified schematic of NHS GGC&C hospital medicine supply  
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 Our analysis considers a SN with four types of 
organizational unit – the DC, external suppliers, hospital 
dispensary (one per hospital), and hospital wards. Eight 
stakeholders from these units, including a procurement 
manager, pharmacists, and distribution technician, have 
been involved in expressing their beliefs about the nature 
and likelihood of medicine supply risks. The Lead 
Pharmacist for NHS GG&C assumed the role of a meta-
stakeholder to constantly support and challenge modeling. 
The case was conducted between March-December 2012. 
 
B. Medicine Supply BN Model 
Fig. 3 shows a partial extract from the BN model. The 
overall model contains 66 nodes, representing risk events, 
and 69 arcs, capturing relationships between these events. 
The top event is defined as a shortfall in performance. 
That is, as a “failure to supply the right medicine to the 
right patient at the right time”. The extract from the BN 
model in Fig. 3 shows one cause of this overall SN failure 
occurs when medicine is not available in the POD locker. 
In turn this event might be due to multiple causes.   
 
 
Fig. 3.  Partial extract from the medicine supply BN model  
 
C. Selected Findings from Medicine Supply Analysis  
We now discuss extracts from our analysis. First, we 
investigate scenarios that could directly affect chance that 
the right medicine is not available at the right time to be 
put into the bedside (POD) locker of a specific hospital 
inpatient. What are the possible causes for this? 
Medicines are available from at least five alternative 
sources, including: (1) the patient’s own medicines taken 
into the hospital upon admission; or (2) the stock of 
medicines normally kept on the ward (according to the 
specific stock list for that ward); or (3) the stock of 
medicines in the hospital dispensary (supplying all wards 
in the hospital); or (4) the medicines stored in the DC; or 
(5) medicines sourced from other wards in the hospital, or 
from other hospitals nearby, or directly from a wholesaler. 
Any of these five sources might cause a failure to deliver 
at any time, but for “the right medicine not to be available 
at all”, all potential medicine sources would have to fail to 
deliver on demand. This redundancy of supply represents 
a deliberate design feature in the SN to keep the risk of 
non-supply as low as practically possible.  
Beliefs about the chance of medicine being 
unavailable from each source have been elicited from the 
stakeholders in the form of subjective probabilities. 
Populating the BN with these probabilities allows us to 
estimate the chances of the top event, which we assume is 
in one of the three states: unavailable; unsuitable quality; 
both unavailable and unsuitable quality. Unavailable 
means that a medicine is not available at all. Unsuitable 
captures situations where, for example, a medicine is 
beyond its expiry date or is not available in the correct 
dosage. If a patient has been prescribed a set of medicines 
in combination, then it could be possible for one of these 
medicines to be unavailable and for another to be 
available but not of a suitable quality.  
For the operational medicine SN, the model estimates 
that the chance of the right medicine not being available 
for the right patient at the right time is approximately five 
times that of the chance of the medicine being unsuitable. 
The chance of one medicine on a particular patient’s 
prescription being unavailable and another medicine on 
that same prescription being unsuitable is negligible. 
We now examine scenarios corresponding to the lack 
of a specific medicine at one or more of the three main 
storage locations. We set the probabilities of selected 
“effect” variables, which represent a scenario where 
medicine is not available from a given source, so that we 
may re-estimate the overall probability of the top event. 
The scenario analysis results are summarized in Fig. 4. 
Note that the numerical values are deliberately not shown. 
The bar chart shown in Fig. 4 indicates that medicine 
unavailability in either the hospital ward, or the hospital 
dispensary, or the DC, has a relatively small impact on the 
chance of the right medicine not being available to a 
specific inpatient compared with situations where there is 
unavailability at multiple sources. As we might expect, 
the chance of failing to provide medicine to a patient is 
highest when a required medicine is neither present in the 
ward cupboard, nor in the hospital dispensary, nor in the 
DC. Such a risky event combination might occur under 
circumstances such as patient admissions outside normal 
working hours (i.e. on weekends/night/ holiday periods). 
As we might expect, we find that that probabilities 
estimated under our scenario analysis always exceed those 
for the actual medicine supply. For example, under the 
scenario that medicine is simultaneously unavailable from 
the ward and the hospital dispensary, the probability of 
the top event increases by 28% above that estimated for 
the actual medicine SN. When, in addition, the medicine 
is unavailable from the regional DC as well as the hospital 
dispensary and the ward, then the probability increases by 
132% over the estimated value for the actual medicine 
supply. 
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Fig. 4.  Relative chances of being able to supply the right medicines to 
the right patient at the right time under 5 source unavailability scenarios  
 
 
 IV.  REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In our example, various back-up medicine supply 
systems exist. Therefore, the medicine SN is normally 
highly secure and a high level of responsiveness to 
inpatients’ medicine requirements can be maintained. 
Management attention needs to be directed at those 
specific situations, such as out-of-hours admissions, 
where a combination of adverse events is more likely to 
occur. Rather than maintaining excess medicine stocks at 
ward level or dispensary level to provide some general 
level of protection, as has tended to be the case in 
practice, the risk/reward position should be moved in a 
more favorable direction by focusing on particular high-
risk situations. For instance, by creating a backup source 
of supply that specifically targets those situations. Our 
example shows the benefit of looking at scenarios 
combining various adverse events, which cannot be easily 
done with conventional risk register. 
Our analysis indicates that participating in the 
development of a BN SN risk model of the kind discussed 
in this article can help managers and other staff involved 
in supply chain operations to solve problems more 
effectively. For example, one of our stakeholders noted 
that modeling the supply process and its associated risks 
helped them to identify problems with particular 
combinations of adverse events more effectively and more 
easily. Our evaluation feedback suggests that the 
workshop discussions enabled stakeholders to develop a 
shared understanding of the possible impact of adverse 
events. Some events that they thought highly significant 
turned out to be less so in practice. For example, the 
manager of the regional DC had been much concerned by 
the high probability of staff shortages in her area. 
However, during the process of quantification, she had to 
provide the effect of ‘shortage staff’ on ‘DC supply delay’ 
and found that it did not generate the huge impact that she 
had previously thought. This was just one of benefits from 
a modeling exercise, as it helped this manager to prioritize 
the key risks rather than trying to cover every possible 
angle. More generally, the modeling exercise uncovered 
opportunities for focusing on particular high-risk 
combinations of events, rather than employing excess 
resources in circumstances where that was less warranted. 
This could help to move the organization’s risk/reward 
position in a more favorable direction. 
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